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Abstract The integrated assessment models (IAMs) that economists use to analyze
the expected costs and benefits of climate policies frequently suggest that the
“optimal” policy is to go slowly and to do relatively little in the near term to reduce
greenhouse gas emissions. We trace this finding to the contestable assumptions and
limitations of IAMs. For example, they typically discount future impacts from climate
change at relatively high rates. This practice may be appropriate for short-term fi-
nancial decisions but its extension to intergenerational environmental issues rests on
several empirically and philosophically controversial hypotheses. IAMs also assign
monetary values to the benefits of climate mitigation on the basis of incomplete
information and sometimes speculative judgments concerning the monetary worth
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of human lives and ecosystems, while downplaying scientific uncertainty about the
extent of expected damages. In addition, IAMs may exaggerate mitigation costs
by failing to reflect the socially determined, path-dependent nature of technical
change and ignoring the potential savings from reduced energy utilization and other
opportunities for innovation. A better approach to climate policy, drawing on recent
research on the economics of uncertainty, would reframe the problem as buying
insurance against catastrophic, low-probability events. Policy decisions should be
based on a judgment concerning the maximum tolerable increase in temperature
and/or carbon dioxide levels given the state of scientific understanding. The appro-
priate role for economists would then be to determine the least-cost global strategy
to achieve that target. While this remains a demanding and complex problem, it is
far more tractable and epistemically defensible than the cost-benefit comparisons
attempted by most IAMs.
Abbreviations
CO2 carbon dioxide
DICE Dynamic Integrated model of Climate and the Economy
GDP Gross Domestic Product
GHGs greenhouse gases
IAMs Integrated Assessment Models
IPCC Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
US United States
1 Introduction
The scientific consensus on climate change is clear and unambiguous; climate change
is an observable phenomenon with the potential for catastrophic impacts (Intergov-
ernmental Panel on Climate Change 2007a). The large-scale computer models that
helped build this consensus have acquired a good reputation in the scientific com-
munity. The leading general circulation models (GCMs) demonstrate ever more
detailed and extensive descriptions of the physical processes of climate change,
which are testable either directly, or indirectly through “backcasting” of historical
climate data. These models are grounded in physical laws that are well-established
both theoretically and empirically, although significant uncertainty surrounds key
parameters such as the climate sensitivity.
Economists also employ multi-equation computer models in their approach to
climate change. These models, known as integrated assessment models (IAMs), build
on the results of GCMs to assess the benefits and costs of climate policy options.
Economists use IAMs to identify the “optimal” policy response, the option that
maximizes the difference between benefits and costs (i.e., net benefits). As the debate
over climate policy shifts from scientific uncertainty to economic feasibility, the
results of IAMs grow in importance. Interpreting IAMs properly is critical for
scientists and others who support a proactive response to the climate problem.
The results of most IAMs are surprising. While many scientists advocate more
stringent emissions targets aimed at stabilizing atmospheric greenhouse gas (GHG)
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concentrations during this century, recent IAMs suggest a cautious approach that
involves only modest early action to limit emissions with the limits gradually be-
coming more stringent over time (Kelly and Kolstad 1999; Tol 2002a; Manne 2004;
Mendelsohn 2004; Nordhaus 2007a). For example, the optimal emissions reduction
rate according to Nordhaus’ most recent version of the widely cited DICE model
is only 14% compared to a “business-as-usual” or no-control emission scenario in
2015, rising to 25% by 2050 and 43% by 2100 (Nordhaus 2007a). Other IAMs have
estimated a positive net benefit from climate change in Organisation for Economic
Co-operation and Development countries (while acknowledging net losses in poor
countries), leading researchers like Tol to conclude that “climate change and green-
house gas abatement policy is essentially a problem of justice” (Tol 2002b). On the
other hand, it has been estimated that the recently considered suite of Congressional
proposals to limit carbon emissions to 50–80% below 1990 levels by 2050 would
impose large welfare losses on the US economy.1
How can we reconcile the apparent disconnect between science, which provides
an objective characterization of the potentially catastrophic implications of climate
change, and economics, which claims that aggressively mitigating climate change is
too costly? We maintain that IAMs enjoy an epistemic status different from their
natural science counterparts, and that economic models mix descriptive analysis
and value judgments in ways that deserve close and critical scrutiny. To build their
models, economists have had to embrace assumptions that reflect long-standing
practices within economics but that nonetheless are associated with well-known
conceptual problems. Alternative models, built on different assumptions that are
equally as plausible as those embedded in commonly cited IAMs, would lead
to qualitatively different results (Cline 1992; Stern 2006; Ackerman and Finlayson
2006).
Scientific understanding of the climate system is continuously improving. For
example, the review article by Hall and Behl (2006) highlights the consequences
of climate instability and rapid large-scale shifts in global climate for the economic
analysis of climate change. Lenton et al. (2008) identify and catalogue potential
“tipping elements” in the climate system. In addition, a variety of decision-making
frameworks extending beyond the conventional utility-maximizing economic com-
ponent of IAMs have been identified (Toth et al. 2001). These include “tolerable
windows” and “safe landing” approaches, “robust decision-making,” and “cost-
effectiveness analysis,” among others. A recent conference was devoted to the impli-
cations of “avoiding dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system”
as a guide to policy-making (Schellnhuber et al. 2006). Our objective in this article is
not to provide a comprehensive review of the most recent developments in climate
science2 or an all-encompassing treatment of decision-making with regard to climate.
Rather, our critique focuses on the conceptual economic framework of the most
common utility-maximizing IAMs and on the specific details of how these models
1The Lieberman-McCain, Feinstein, Kerry-Snowe, and Sanders-Boxer bills specify reductions of
50–80% below 1990 emissions levels by 2050. US emissions are now 15% above their 1990 levels.
A recent MIT assessment of the congressional cap-and-trade proposals estimated net welfare losses
ranging up to about 2% of GDP by 2050 (Paltsev et al. 2007).
2Examples of articles dealing with the kinds of issues treated by Hall and Behl (2006) include
Kennedy et al. (2008), Hoegh-Guldberg et al. (2007), and Buffett and Archer (2004).
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represent climate costs and benefits. We identify three principal areas in which the
standard economic approach is arguably deficient: the discounted utility framework,
which attaches less weight to future outcomes; the characterization and monetization
of the benefits of mitigation; and the projection of mitigation costs, which rests on
assumptions about the pace and nature of technical change. We address these issues
in the following three sections and conclude with recommendations for an alternative
approach to the economics of climate change that reflects recent advances in the
economics of uncertainty.
2 The discounted utility framework
IAMs, like the economic theory from which they are derived, start from a particular
understanding of human nature and preferences and seek to identify the choices that
will maximize the satisfaction of those desires. Climate outcomes enter the analysis
as factors that increase or decrease human satisfaction. The “optimal” target is not a
safe or pre-determined climate stabilization level, but rather the maximum subjective
satisfaction.
Echoing nineteenth century utilitarian moral philosophy, economists refer to
satisfaction as “utility” and assume it to be a scalar variable—in short, an ideal
objective for maximization. This stylized psychological model, as it has been elabo-
rated in economics, requires careful estimation and comparison of benefits and costs.
To compare utilities across generations, economists invoke assumptions about how
much additional weight present outcomes deserve over future outcomes. But when
economists resort to this technique of discounting the future, the present value of
the harms caused by future climate change can easily shrink to the point where it is
hardly “worth” doing anything today in order to prevent them.
The basic construct of the typical IAM involves a social welfare function that
stretches into the distant future (far enough ahead to experience significant climate
change). Frequently, IAMs assume a single representative agent in each generation,
or equivalently, that all members of a generation are identical in both consumption





e−ρtU [c (t)] dt (1)
where W is social welfare, ρ is the “rate of pure time preference,” c(t) is consumption
at time t, and U[•] is the utility function specifying how much utility is derived from a
particular level of consumption. Economists have studied this problem since the time
of Ramsey (1928), and the methods they have developed to solve it are now standard
elements of the conventional IAM framework. Although this framework dominates
the economics of climate change, economists have proposed a number of alternatives
(e.g., Howarth and Norgaard 1992; Chichilnisky et al. 1995; Howarth 1998; DeCanio
2003; Bella 2006).
Equation 1 and the techniques required to maximize W embody a large set of
questionable assumptions. First note that with ρ > 0, a given amount of utility
occurring further in the future is worth less than the same amount of utility today.
This implies that the well-being of this generation matters more than that of its
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children, who in turn matter more than their children. Thus e−ρt may be interpreted
as the relative weighting given to the utility or well-being of various generations. If a
generation is 35 years in duration and ρ = 0.05, the weight given to a unit of utility at
the end of the second generation is only 3% of the weight given to the same unit of
utility today. Numerous economists and philosophers since Ramsey have argued that
weighing all generations equally, ρ = 0, is the only ethically defensible practice (for
modern treatments, see Cline 1992 and Broome 1994); yet IAMs continue to assume
ρ > 0. This is at least in part a mathematical necessity: with ρ = 0, the integral in
Eq. 1 does not converge if future utility is constant or growing (or merely declining
sufficiently gradually) (Dasgupta and Heal 1979).
Second, implicit in the formulation of a social welfare function is the aggregation
of preferences across different individuals. In Eq. 1, this aggregation depends only
on the total consumption of goods and not on the distribution of that consumption.
Whatever method for aggregation is used, it necessarily involves strong and value-
laden assumptions.3 This is an inescapable consequence of the discounted utility
framework. Because the framework requires that preferences be compared and
added within and across generations, it forces economists to make normative de-
cisions regarding the comparison of individual utilities and discount rates. Though a
social welfare function can be solved mathematically to yield the “optimal” solution,
the solution is dependent on the values and biases that are unavoidably embedded in
the model and its parameterization.
Third, it is worth noting that the discounted utility characterization of behavior for
individuals that underlies this formulation of the social policy problem is not well-
supported by the evidence (Frederick et al. 2002). The optimizing psychological and
behavioral assumptions adopted by economic modelers do not have the status of
laws of nature. They are matters of convenience and convention, not deep structural
features of human action (Laitner et al. 2000; Kahneman and Tversky 2000).
The formulation of Eq. 1 does not include uncertainty about either the conse-
quences of climate change or about the future growth of the economy. This omission
is serious, for it is at odds with empirical observations and has strong implications for
the treatment of discounting. In this context, it is significant that a recent National
Research Council report lists “realistic and credible treatment of uncertainties” as
one of its 11 elements of effective assessments (Committee on Analysis of Global
Change Assessments 2007). The problems caused by uncertainty can be illustrated by
an even simpler version of the decision problem represented by Eq. 1. Our discussion
closely follows Cochrane (2005), Mehra (2003) and Howarth (2003, 2009), but the
theory is entirely generic. To keep things simple, instead of the infinite horizon
3One implication of the aggregation method is that if all members of society have equal weight
in the social welfare function and all experience diminishing marginal utility to the same degree,
the social welfare at any point in time could be increased by redistribution of income from the
wealthy to the poor, provided the effects of this redistribution on incentives to produce and save
are ignored. An alternate approach—weighting individuals’ contribution to social welfare function
by their wealth—has obvious drawbacks from an ethical point of view. The same kinds of problems
regarding aggregation across individuals and nations plague estimates of the costs of mitigating
climate change—the distribution of the costs has a major impact on both the ethical evaluation of
proposed policies and their political feasibility.
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intertemporal welfare function, suppose the social decision is based on maximizing a









where 1/(1 + ρ) is the “discount factor” corresponding to e−ρt in Eq. 1, E [•]
represents the expected value of the argument as of time t, and ct and ct+1 are
consumption at times t and t + 1 respectively. Then if agents are able at time t to
purchase an asset (i.e., make an investment) that has an (uncertain) payoff xt+1 in










This is simply the first-order condition for solution to the problem of maximizing
U in Eq. 2. The issues of concern to us can be illustrated without loss of generality
by making the common simplifying assumption that u has the form of the “constant
relative risk aversion” type, namely
u (c) = c
1−η − 1
1 − η (4)
where the parameter η is the “coefficient of relative risk aversion.” The marginal
utility of consumption is given by u′ [c] = c−η, which is decreasing in c provided η is
positive. In the absence of uncertainty, it is easy to show that Eqs. 3 and 4 yield a
formula for the market interest or discount rate given by
1 + r = (1 + g)η (1 + ρ) ⇒ r ≈ ρ + ηg (5)
where g is the rate of growth of consumption, with the approximation holding for
small ρ and g. By analogy with short-term financial calculations, it is typically asserted
that future incomes and consumption should be discounted at the interest rate r
(in contrast to utility, which is discounted at the rate ρ). That is, $Y at a time N
years from now has a present value of only $Ye−rN for continuous time models, or
$Y(1 + r)−N for annual calculations in discrete-time models. With r greater than
zero, this becomes the basis for the reduced importance of distant-future outcomes
in economic calculations.
This shrinkage of future values is not an inevitable consequence of Eq. 5. It has
been noted before by Tol (1994), Amano (1997), and Dasgupta et al. (1999) that if
environmental damage is sufficiently great so as to reduce consumption in the future,
then g may be negative and the discount rate will actually be less than the pure
rate of time preference. A sufficiently negative g could even make r negative in this
situation. In addition, Eq. 5 needs modification if the economy consists of multiple
goods with different growth rates of consumption. If we define the economy to
include environmental services, the proper discount rate for evaluating investments
in environmental protection will be considerably lower than r, and possibly even
negative, as long as the elasticity of substitution in demand between produced goods
and environmental services is low and the produced goods sector grows faster than
the environmental services sector (which may be constant or even declining) (Hoel
and Sterner 2007).
Climatic Change (2009) 95:297–315 303
When uncertainty enters the picture, Eq. 5 is no longer valid. In the real world,
multiple interest rates and a variety of assets that reflect varying degrees of risk are
observed. There is no single “market” discount rate that embodies the return on
investment. The importance of this simple empirical fact for climate policy analysis
has been pointed out by Howarth (2003), and a number of economists have begun
to explore the consequences of uncertainty for discounting (e.g. Newell and Pizer
2003; Ludwig et al. 2005; Howarth 2009; Howarth and Norgaard 2007; Sandsmark
and Vennemo 2007; Pesaran et al. 2007). In particular, the discount rate (or expected
return) attached to a particular investment has to take into account the covariance





] = r f − cov
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where E[ri] is the expected market discount rate for asset of type or risk class i and
r f is the risk-free discount rate. Equation 6 requires some interpretation, because
E[ri] moves in the opposite direction as the price of asset i, and the marginal utility
of consumption u′ decreases as consumption increases. Cochrane (2005, pp 13–14)
puts it this way:
Investors do not like uncertainty about consumption. If you buy an asset whose
payoff covaries positively with consumption, one that pays off well when you
are already feeling wealthy, and pays off badly when you are already feeling
poor, that asset will make your consumption stream more volatile. You will
require a low price to induce you to buy such an asset. If you buy an asset whose
payoff covaries negatively with consumption, it helps to smooth consumption
and so is more valuable than its expected payoff might indicate. Insurance is
an extreme example. Insurance pays off exactly when wealth and consumption
would otherwise be low—you get a check when your house burns down. For
this reason, you are happy to hold insurance, even though you expect to lose
money—even though the price of insurance is greater than its expected payoff
discounted at the risk-free rate.4
In the particular case in which (ct+1/ct) is lognormally distributed, with E[ln(ct+1/
ct)] = g and Var[ln(ct+1/ct)] = σ 2, the risk-free rate can be expressed in terms of the
underlying parameters as5
r f = ρ + ηg − 1
2
η2σ 2 (7)
4Or, consider the case of equities. Equities have high returns when consumption is high, so the
covariance between the equity discount rate and the marginal utility of consumption is negative
(because the marginal utility of consumption is lower when consumption is high). Hence the equity
discount rate is higher than the risk-free rate because of the negative sign on the covariance term
in Eq. 6.
5An expository derivation is given in Mehra (2003).
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where the third term on the right side of the equation is attributable to precautionary
savings. Examination of Eqs. 6 and 7 therefore shows quite clearly that “the”
discount rate under uncertainty is quite different from the “Ramsey rule” discount
rate given by Eq. 5. Even if the rate of growth of consumption is positive on average,
considerations of precautionary saving and insurance can lower the discount rate
appropriate for valuing climate protection investments (Howarth 2009).
Uncertainty about the underlying structure of the interaction between climate
change and the economy creates additional problems for the discounted utility
framework. In a series of pathbreaking papers, Weitzman (2007a, b, 2009) has
shown that climate catastrophes with low but unknown probabilities and very high
damages dominate discounting considerations in formulating a rational policy. This
fundamental challenge to the standard IAM approach will be discussed in the
concluding section.
Finally, it should be noted that there are serious empirical problems with all of
the discounting formulas exemplified by Eqs. 5–7. Plausible and/or historical values
of the parameters of these equations (the coefficient of relative risk aversion, the
growth rate and variance of consumption, the covariance between returns and the
marginal utility of consumption, and the subjective rate of time preference) do not
yield discount rates that match the rates which are observed in the market. These
anomalies go by names such as “the equity premium puzzle” and “the risk-free rate
puzzle,” and they show up strongly not only in data for the US, but also in data
for other countries with well-developed asset markets (Campbell 2003; Mehra and
Prescott 2003). Despite an enormous amount of effort by the best economists to
resolve these paradoxes (literally hundreds of scholarly papers have been published
on these puzzles), there is no professional consensus on how they might be resolved.
These paradoxes present the same kind of challenge to the conventional economic
theory of discounting as the Michelson-Morley experiment presented to Newtonian
physics. It is surely dubious for climate policy analysis to rely exclusively on a model
that faces unexplained empirical challenges to its fundamental theory. As Mehra and
Prescott (who originally discovered the equity premium puzzle 1985) comment,
The puzzle cannot be dismissed lightly, since much of our economic intuition
is based on the very class of models that fall short so dramatically when
confronted with financial data. It underscores the failure of paradigms central
to financial and economic modeling to capture the characteristic that appears
to make stocks comparatively so risky. Hence the viability of using this class of
models for any quantitative assessment, say, for instance, to gauge the welfare
implications of alternative stabilization policies, is thrown open to question
(Mehra and Prescott 2003, p. 911).
Mehra and Prescott were referring to policies for macroeconomic stabilization, but
their admonition applies equally to the use of IAMs to guide climate policy.
3 Predicting the unpredictable and pricing the priceless
IAMs analyze the costs and benefits of climate mitigation. Cost-benefit analysis
assumes that costs and benefits can be expressed in monetary terms with a reasonable
degree of confidence. At least in principle, the costs of environmental protection
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consist of well-defined monetary expenditures (although there are significant prob-
lems in the standard approach to projecting mitigation costs, as discussed in the next
section). The benefits of environmental protection, however, are generally more
difficult to quantify. In the case of climate change, economists confront a double
problem; the benefits of mitigation are intrinsically unpredictable and unpriceable.
The unpredictability of climate outcomes reflects, in part, what we do not know,
because the effects of climate change are quite likely to be non-marginal displace-
ments that put us outside the realm of historical human experience. Unpredictability
is reflected in what we do know as well. We know that the Earth’s climate is a
strongly nonlinear system that may be characterized by threshold effects and chaotic
dynamics. Under such conditions, forecasts are necessarily indeterminate; it becomes
appropriate to say that within a broad range of possible outcomes, anything can
happen. IAMs, for the most part, do not incorporate this approach to uncertainty,
but instead adopt best guesses about likely outcomes (Kelly and Kolstad 1999; Tol
2002a; Manne 2004; Mendelsohn 2004; Nordhaus 2007a). The Stern Review (2006)
represents an advance over standard practice in this respect, employing a Monte
Carlo analysis to estimate the effects of uncertainty in many climate parameters. As
a result, the Stern Review finds a substantially greater benefit from mitigation than if
it had simply used “best guesses.”
But underneath one layer of assumptions lies another. Even if we assume precision
in predicting climate impacts, the problem of assigning meaningful monetary values
to human life, health, and natural ecosystems still remains. This problem affects
all cost-benefit analysis. Because a numerical answer is required, environmental
economists have long been in the business of constructing surrogate prices for
seemingly priceless values. The results are not impressive. Should we estimate the
value of human life on the basis of the small wage differentials between more and
less dangerous jobs, as Clinton administration analysts assumed? Or, should we
rely on responses to long questionnaires asking people how much they would pay
to avoid small risks of death under abstract hypothetical scenarios, as the Bush
administration did?6 Should we value ecosystems according to what people living
nearby report they are willing to pay to preserve their scenic vistas or their favorite
large animals? A non-economist could be forgiven for assuming that these are
rhetorical questions. Yet these approaches are regularly applied in policy analyses
to estimate monetary values for health and environmental benefits (Diamond and
Hausman 1994; Hanemann 1994; Portney 1994).
Should the value of a human life depend on individual or national income levels?
Should nature located in a rich country be worth more than if it is located in a poor
country? Remarkably, economists often answer “yes” to both of these disturbing
questions. Values of human life differentiated by national income made a brief
and unwelcome appearance in the IPCC’s Second Assessment Report (1996) but
appeared to be banished by the time of the Third Assessment Report (2001). Similar
values, however, continue to appear in the economics literature, making their way
into IAMs (Tol 2002b; Bosello et al. 2006), where the lives of citizens of rich countries
are often assumed to be worth much more than those of their poorer counterparts.
6See Ackerman and Heinzerling (2004), especially Chapter 4, pp. 75–81.
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Income bias is inherent to the process of valuation. When asked how much they
are willing to pay to protect some small part of the natural world (a technique
called contingent valuation), individuals’ responses cannot help but reflect how much
they are actually able to afford. While this survey method may provide plausible
information about subjective values for local amenities, such as parks that neigh-
borhoods will pay for, it is of little use in a complex, interdependent world where
essential ecosystem services are not always visible or local and where incomes and
information are very unequally distributed.
Indeed, one of the anomalies of the IAMs is the frequency with which economists
have discovered benefits from near-term warming. Even if benefits are thought to
disappear after a few degrees, or a few decades, a high discount rate ensures that
the years of benefits loom large in present value terms when compared to the more
remote and heavily discounted later years of damages.
For example, Nordhaus long maintained that there is a substantial subjective
willingness to pay for warmer weather on the part of people in cold, rich countries.
He observes that US households spend more on outdoor recreation in the summer
than in the winter and, on the basis of that slim empirical foundation, concludes that
subjective enjoyment of the climate worldwide would be maximized at a year-round
average temperature of 20◦C (Nordhaus and Boyer 2000). This is well above the
current global average; it is approximately the temperature of Houston and New
Orleans in the US, or Tripoli in Libya. There are many people who live in areas
hotter than Houston, but they are generally much poorer than the people who live
in areas colder than Houston. Thus if willingness to pay is indeed limited by ability
to pay, there is a large net global willingness to pay for warming. In the 2000 version
of DICE, this factor outweighed all damages and implied net benefits from warming
until the middle of this century (Nordhaus and Boyer 2000). However, that oddity of
the earlier DICE has been criticized (Ackerman and Finlayson 2006) and the latest
DICE (of 2007), while still including and monetizing subjective gains for warming
up to 20◦C along with other costs and benefits, no longer allows any region to have
overall net benefits from warming (Nordhaus 2007b).
A more quantifiable, but equally contestable, benefit from warming involves
the impacts of warming on agriculture. Early studies of climate impacts suggested
substantial agricultural gains from warming, as a result of longer growing seasons in
high latitudes and the effects of CO2 fertilization on many crops. Mendelsohn et al.
(2000), and Tol (2002a) incorporated large estimated agricultural gains from early
stages of warming. Successive studies, however, have steadily reduced the estimated
benefits. Outdoor experiments have shown smaller benefits from CO2 fertilization
than earlier experiments conducted in greenhouses (Intergovernmental Panel on
Climate Change 2007b). Recent research predicts that the negative effects of ground-
level of ozone, which is produced by the same fossil fuel combustion processes that
emit CO2, may offset the impacts of a longer growing season and CO2 fertilization
and lead to a small net decrease in agricultural productivity in the US (Reilly et al.
2007). Another recent study finds that the market value of non-irrigated farmland
in the US is highly correlated with climate variables. The optimum value occurs at
roughly the current US average temperature with somewhat more than the current
US average rainfall. This study’s projections of climate change to the end of the
century imply substantial losses in farm value, due primarily to crop damage from
the increase in the number of days above 34◦C (Schlenker et al. 2006).
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As these examples of potential benefits suggest, there is a significant degree
of subjective judgment involved in estimating the value of climate damages; but
IAMs are completely dependent on the shape of their assumed damage functions.
It is conventional to assume that damages are a quadratic function of temperature
increases, based, perhaps, on the common notion that damages should rise faster than
temperature. But why a quadratic function in particular? The Stern Review (2006)
made the exponent on the damage function a Monte Carlo parameter, ranging from
1 to 3 (damages ranged from a linear to a cubic function of temperature). Even
though Stern’s modal estimate was only 1.3, the cases with a higher exponent had
a large effect on the outcome. In later sensitivity analyses in response to critics, the
Stern Review researchers showed that if the assumed damages were a cubic function
of temperature, the result was an enormous increase in the estimate of climate
damages, changing their prediction by more than 20% of world output (Dietz et al.
2007).
In short, unlike the scientific modeling involved in GCMs, the results of IAMs are
tied to subjective judgments about the shape of the damage function as we move into
temperature regimes that are unknown in human or recent planetary history.
4 Technology forecasts: not so bright
IAMs simulate the macroeconomic impacts of climate policies designed to achieve
particular emissions trajectories. IAMs typically estimate costs as an annual per-
centage loss in GDP. IAMs cannot forecast job losses—the issue most politicians
demand clarity on—because supply equals demand in every market (including the
labor market) by design. The IPCC’s Fourth Assessment Report summarizes the
range of cost estimates for a low stabilization target (445–535 ppm-CO2 equivalent)
and finds that for all available studies, costs do not exceed 3% of global GDP in
the medium term (i.e., 2030). For higher stabilization targets, estimates range from
2–2.5% of GDP (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 2007c). Is 3% of
global GDP worth sacrificing to avoid the damages of climate change? In the US,
losing 3% of GDP in 2007 would mean reverting to the per capita income Americans
enjoyed in 2006. In dollar terms, it is equivalent to spending $350 billion per year or
$1,170 per capita. Whether we think $350 billion per year is too high a price to pay to
avoid climate change depends on the severity of the climate damages we anticipate.
Given the problems inherent in IAM estimates of climate damages, it is impossible
to conclude from IAMs that 3% of GDP is, or is not, worth spending.
What we do know is that there is good reason to believe that IAMs overestimate
the costs of achieving stabilization targets. Estimating mitigation costs in dollar terms
is more straightforward, in principle, than measuring mitigation benefits. The adop-
tion of energy-efficient equipment, appliances, industrial processes, and automobiles,
as well as more widespread use of combined heat and power technologies, wind
energy systems, solar panels, and other measures for reducing emissions all involve
purchases of marketed goods and services whose attendant cash flows can be easily
counted. The evolution of these technologies is uncertain, however, particularly
over the long time periods involved in climate modeling. Forecasts of mitigation
costs, therefore, depend on assumptions about the pace of development of new (and
existing) technologies and their costs.
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IAMs typically adopt conservative assumptions about the pace of technical
change, abstracting away from the potential for learning-by-doing and the positive
role public policy can play in steering investment choices and promoting technical
change. Most IAMs assume a predictable annual rate of productivity improvement
in energy use, and/or a predictable rate of decrease in emissions per unit of output.
Thus a paradoxical result emerges from the models’ overly mechanistic structure.
Because climate change is a long term crisis, and predictable, inexorable techno-
logical change will make it easier and cheaper to reduce emissions in the future, it
seems better to wait before addressing the problem of climate change. Hence, most
IAMs advocate a cautious approach that involves only modest early action to limit
emissions with gradually increasing limits over time. Alternative models that assume
endogenous technical change reach different conclusions and frequently recommend
more aggressive carbon abatement policies, with results varying according to how
the models are specified (e.g., Goulder and Schneider 1999; Gerlagh 2007; for recent
surveys of this literature, see the special issue of Resource and Energy Economics
edited by Carraro et al. 2003; Edenhofer et al. 2006, and the special issue of The
Energy Journal IAEE IAEE (2006) in which it appears; and Gillingham et al. 2007).
Furthermore, most IAMs exclude the possibility for “no-regrets” options—
investments that could reduce emissions without imposing significant opportunity
costs. These options do exist, largely in the area of improved energy efficiency
(Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 1996; Interlaboratory Working Group
2000; Lovins 2005; Elliott et al. 2006; Shipley and Elliott 2006; Laitner et al. 2006;
McKinsey Global Institute 2007). IAMs ignore these opportunities because they
assume that the economy functions on its production possibilities frontier. This
means that businesses and consumers behave with perfect rationality to achieve their
objectives and are successful in optimizing their behaviors. It is increasingly well-
understood in the economics literature, however, that businesses do not exploit every
opportunity for profit. There are many opportunities to increase efficiency, reduce
costs, and improve productivity that are not taken up due to organizational and
institutional constraints (DeCanio et al. 2000, 2001). Incomplete information about
technologies, societal norms, difficulty in capitalizing on energy efficient investments,
and distorted market prices for energy are all well known examples of barriers to the
adoption of more energy efficient measures. Well-designed climate policy can play
a decisive role in removing these barriers. If technical change is socially determined
and its results are path dependent, we can only arrive in the future with new energy
technology choices available if we start conscious, carefully planned development of
those technologies today. Waiting for the deus ex machina of technical change, the
misleading option suggested by IAMs, will ensure that we face fewer options in the
future at significantly higher costs.7
7Some zero-cost adaptations to climate change may also exist. However, the IPCC’s Fourth Assess-
ment Report notes that “[m]ost studies of specific adaptation plans and actions argue that there are
likely to be both limits and barriers to adaptation as a response to climate change. The U.S. National
Assessment (2001), for example, maintains that adaptation will not necessarily make the aggregate
impacts of climate change negligible or beneficial, nor can it be assumed that all available adaptation
measures will actually be taken” (2007b, p. 733).
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There are more satisfying ways of mapping cost-effective technologies into climate
models that yield different impacts. The costs of climate policy depend heavily on
how technology and its benefits over time are characterized (Worrell et al. 2003).
For example, Krause et al. (2002, 2003) include the efficiency-improving possibilities
documented in the “5-lab study” (Interlaboratory Working Group 2000) to arrive at
least-cost estimates of the economic costs of emissions reduction. Policy assessments
typically include savings on energy bills and lower compliance costs, such as the
benefits of new energy technologies, but overlook the potential for “non-energy”
benefits, such as lower maintenance costs, increased production yields, safer work
conditions, positive spill-over effects, and economies of scale and scope. These
benefits increase the return on energy-related investments; if recognized, firms and
consumers may become more willing to adopt or invest in them (Finman and Laitner
2001). These benefits may, in some cases, exceed the associated energy bill savings
(Worrell et al. 2003).
The productivity-enhancing effects of investing in these technologies can help off-
set any drag on the economy imposed by higher fossil-fuel prices. New technologies
can stimulate new investment, save consumers money, stimulate productive research
and development with spill-over benefits for other sectors and positive multiplier
effects, and help to reduce energy imports and increase technology exports. Massive
public investment in military technology since World War II led to the widespread
adoption of jet aircraft, semi-conductors, and the Internet by the private sector and is
partly responsible for the technological advantage the US holds globally. In the early
1980s, US companies led the world in wind energy technologies. Today, we import
those technologies (Goodstein 2007). As the rest of the world moves forward with
climate policy, the US risks losing its technological advantage unless it charts (and
funds) a careful and deliberate new technology path.
5 Insurance, precaution, and the contribution of climate economics
In the three preceding sections, we argued that most IAMs rely on an analytical
framework that privileges immediate, individual consumption over future-oriented
concerns; that the benefits, or avoided damages, from climate mitigation are both
unpredictable in detail and intrinsically non-monetizable; and that the conventional
economic view of technology misrepresents the dynamic, socially determined nature
of technical change. Not much is left, therefore, of the standard economic approach
and its ambitions to perform a complete cost-benefit analysis of climate policy
options. In light of these criticisms, how should we think about policy options and
the economics of climate change?
It should be emphasized that the optimal control approach to climate policy em-
bodied in Eq. 1 above is not the only one proposed in the literature. For example, the
early growth literature proposed the notion of the “Golden Rule” steady state growth
path (Solow 1970). In this simple model with the savings rate as the only policy vari-
able, optimal growth is the path yielding the highest level of consumption per capita
among all sustainable growth paths. Sustainable growth, in this context, is a path
that does not sacrifice the consumption of future generations by consuming society’s
capital (including natural capital) for the benefit of the present generation. In such
a model, the market rate of interest is equal to the rate of growth of consumption.
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If the “willingness to pay” on the part of future generations to avert environmental
destruction is proportional to income, then the effective discount rate on the Golden
Rule growth path is zero (DeCanio 2003). The notion of the Golden Rule growth
path has been generalized to “Green Golden Rule” growth, with different implica-
tions for the discount rate depending on the assumptions made about the interaction
between the environment and the market economy (Chichilnisky et al. 1995; Bella
2006).
A present generation that cares nothing about the fate of future generations
will do nothing to preserve the stability of the Earth’s climate, and no economic
calculations can show otherwise. But whether and how much people care about
the future can be represented in various ways—through the rate of subjective time
preference in optimal growth models, through the weighting of different generations’
welfare in overlapping generations models (Howarth and Norgaard 1992; Howarth
1996), through thought experiments in which the generations are able to transact
with one another (DeCanio and Niemann 2006)—and the results, not unexpectedly,
will reflect the depth and strength of the intergenerational ties. The upshot of these
alternative ways of characterizing the intergenerational decision-making problem
is that the normative assumptions that are made about how future generations are
treated are as important as the technical details. Not having happened yet, the future
is unobservable; moreover, there are no reliable, universally accepted economic laws
that shape our understanding of the future in the way that the laws of natural science
do for the physical reality of climate change. When it comes to economics, there is no
escape from value-laden assumptions about the future. Furthermore, consciousness
and intergenerational concern are influenced by social and political discourse. In the
case of climate policy where fundamental values and ethical principles are at stake, it
is an abdication of responsibility for economists to act as if peoples’ preferences are
simply given and fixed.
One of the most interesting new areas of economic theory as applied to climate in-
volves the analysis of uncertainty. If the probabilities of a range of possible outcomes
were known, as in casino games or homework exercises in statistics classes, then there
would be no need for a new theory; it would be a straightforward matter to calculate
the expected value of climate outcomes and economic consequences. However, this
is a poor model for many of the most important climate problems. When proba-
bility distributions themselves are unknown, the problem of uncertainty is much
more difficult to address. The combination of unknown probability distributions
and potentially disastrous outcomes provides a strong motivation for precautionary
policy, as insurance against those disasters. As noted in a recent review of scientific
knowledge about potential “tipping elements” of earth systems, “[s]ociety may be
lulled into a false sense of security by smooth projections of global change....present
knowledge suggests that a variety of tipping elements could reach their critical point
within this century under anthropogenic climate change” (Lenton et al. 2008; see
also Committee on Abrupt Climate Change 2002). Uncertainty about the climate
sensitivity, the key parameter in assessing the probability for ranges of potential
equilibrium global temperature changes, is intrinsically resistant to improvements
in scientific understanding of particular climate processes (Roe and Baker 2007).
Several economists working at the theoretical frontier have proposed new ways of
dealing with these kinds of deep uncertainties (e.g., Gjerde et al. 1999; Chichilnisky
2000; Hall and Behl 2006; Dasgupta 2008; Weitzman 2007a, b, 2009). For example,
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Martin Weitzman has developed a model applicable to financial markets as well as
climate change. People learn about the world through repeated experiences, but if
the relevant structure of the world is changing rapidly or greatly enough, only the
most recent experiences can be relied on, and everyone is effectively engaged in
Bayesian estimation from a finite sample. In this circumstance, the best available
estimate of the true probability distribution has fat tails. Because people are risk-
averse, the attempt to avoid the disturbing possibility of very large losses dominates
policy decisions. The result, Weitzman argues, is that fine-tuning the estimates of the
most likely level of climate damages is irrelevant; what matters is how bad and how
likely the worst extremes of the possible outcomes are. There is little doubt that the
95th percentile, or 98th percentile, of possible adverse climate outcomes over the
next century (to pick two arbitrary points out in the tail of the distribution) would
look like the devastation of the planet in a science-fiction dystopia, not like a matter
for carefully weighing costs and benefits.
Intuitively, this is the same logic that motivates the purchase of insurance, a
precautionary decision that people make all the time. The most likely number of
house fires that you will experience next year, or even in your lifetime, is zero. Very
few homeowners find this a compelling reason to go without fire insurance. Similarly,
healthy young adults often buy life insurance to protect their children’s future in the
worst possible case. Residential fires, and deaths of healthy young adults, have annual
probabilities measured in the tenths of 1%. In other words, people routinely insure
themselves against personal catastrophes that are much less likely than worst-case
climate catastrophes for the planet.8
How would this perspective change our approach to climate economics and policy
choices? Economics would find itself in a humbler role, no longer charged with
determining the optimal policy. Instead, a discussion of scientific information about
catastrophic possibilities and consequences would presumably lead to the choice of
maximum safe targets, expressed in terms of allowable increases in temperature and
CO2 levels. Once safe targets have been established, there remain the extremely
complex and intellectually challenging tasks—for which the tools of economics are
both appropriate and powerful—of determining the least-cost global strategy for
achieving those targets, designing policies that effectively and with confidence meet
the targets,9 and sharing responsibility for the costs and implementation of that
strategy.
This cost-effectiveness task, despite its daunting difficulty, is more limited than
the cost–benefit analysis attempted by IAMs—and the reduced scope avoids many of
the problems we have discussed. Discounting is less of an issue, because the costs of
mitigation and adaptation, while still spread out in time, generally occur much sooner
than the full range of anticipated damages. Precise estimation and monetization of
8Ironically, given the subsequent focus on cost-benefit analysis, one of the precursors of current
IAMs appeared in a book titled, Buying Greenhouse Insurance: The Economic Costs of CO2
Emissions Limits (Manne and Richels 1992).
9The “tolerable windows approach” is one promising development in this direction. This method-
ology “concentrates on a few key attributes (e.g., acceptable impacts and costs) and provides an
envelope for future action. Which course should be taken within the envelope?” (Toth et al. 2003,
pp. 54–55). A special issue of Climatic Change (2003, nos. 1–2; see Toth 2003) contains a number of
papers embodying this approach.
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benefits is no longer necessary, because cost-effectiveness analysis takes the benefits
side as fixed (or, in the language of economics, assigns an infinite shadow price to the
constraint of meeting the chosen target—another way of saying that cost calculations
are not allowed to override the prior choice of a safe standard).
There are two take-home messages here. The first is that policy makers and
scientists should be skeptical of efforts by economists to specify optimal policy paths
using the current generation of IAMs. These models do not embody the state of
the art in the economic theory of uncertainty, and the foundations of the IAMs are
much shakier than the general circulation models that represent our best current
understanding of physical climate processes. Not only do the IAMs entail an implicit
philosophical stance that is highly contestable, they suffer from technical deficiencies
that are widely recognized within economics. Second, economists do have useful
insights for climate policy. While economics itself is insufficient to determine the
urgency for precautionary action in the face of low-probability climate catastrophes,
or make judgments about intergenerational and intragenerational justice, it does
point the way towards achieving climate stabilization in a cost-effective manner.
IAMs cannot, however, be looked to as the ultimate arbiter of climate policy choices.
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